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ABSTRACT

The subject of the following study is Friedrich Hayek's
belief that there is a terra incognita of the self; that human beings
are

incapable of becoming thoroughly self-aware of their own

cognitive processes. My thesis is that Hayek affirms Friedrich
Nietzsche’s claim that "we are unknown to ourselves," and that he
does so improving on Nietzsche’s connectionist theory of mind. I
then

go on

to demonstrate

how

this

improved theory

informs both Hayek's political and economic theories.

of mind

FRIEDRICH HAYEK'S TERRA INCOGNITA OF THE SELF

Shortly

before

his

death

in

1984

"the

greatest

of

Nietzsche's modern disciples,"1 Michel Foucault, began assigning
his

students

the

works

of Friedrich

Hayek.

According

to his

American biographer, Foucault
advised his students... to read with special care the
collected works of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich
Hayek— distinguished Austrian economists, strident
yet prescient critics of Marxism, apostles of a
libertarian strand of modern social thought rooted in
a defense of the free-market as a citadel of
individual liberty and a bulwark against the power of
the state.2
But why should Foucault's philosophical reflections veer off in
this surprising direction if his Nietzschean views and the views
of

Hayek

political

are

normally

spectrum?:

associated

Hayek's

with

with
the

opposite

ends

libertarian

of

the

right

and

Nietzsche's with the post-modern left. Why should Foucault assign
Hayek

if

"Hayek's

work

is

in

the

tradition

of

classical

liberalism"3 while Nietzsche is "best known...as an opponent of
political

liberalism?"4 Perhaps Foucault

recognized something

1 Edward W. Said, "Michael Foucault, 1926-1985," After
Foucaulb:„ Humanistic Knowledge. Postmodern Challenges ed.
Jonathan Arac (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 1.
2 James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1993), 310.
3 John Gray, Hayek on Liberty, 2nd ed.
Blackwell, 1986), 1.

(Oxford: Basil

4 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist,.
Antichrist, 4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1974), 412.
2

3

others overlooked. Perhaps he recognized a philosophical parallel
between these disparate thinkers.
In the following pages I attempt to demonstrate that there
is just such a parallel between Hayek and Nietzsche.

I contend

that both thinkers maintain that "we are unknown to ourselves;"5
that there is a terra incognita of the self. The focal point of this
paper, however, is that Nietzsche leaves us stranded. He does not
explain adequately why we are inhibited from knowing ourselves.
My thesis is that Hayek rescues us from where Nietzsche leaves us
marooned, and that he does so by improving on Nietzsche's theory
of mind. Indeed,

I argue that Hayek surpasses Nietzsche insofar

as he offers us a more detailed explanation as to why a portion
of the mind must remain unknown to the conscious self. The paper
is organized into three sections:

In the first section I will

review the parallels between Hayek and Nietzsche's theories of
mind. In the second section I will demonstrate how Hayek improves
Nietzsche's theory. In the third and final section I will focus
on

how Hayek's improvement

informs

both

his political

and

economic theories.
I . A REVIEW OF THE PARALLELS
HAYEK AND NIETZSCHE 'S THEORIES

BETWEEN
OF MIND

Hayek's theory of mind is not located in a single text.
Rather,

it

is contained

in

the

corpus

of his

writings.

Nevertheless, Hayek's first and most substantial foray into the
subject of mind occurred when he began writing The Sensory O rder in

5 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals trans.
Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books,
1967), 17.

4

1921.

Soon after embarking on the manuscript,

attention

was drawn to

issues

of economic

however,

Hayek's

theory and he was

unable to complete the project until 1948. The book's immediate
goal was to criticize the positivist psychology of Ernst Mach
which dominated the field of theories of mind from before 1918.
Mach was unsatisfied with the notion that there are two
domains,

a physical domain and a mental domain,

between which

interaction is impossible. Mach was one of the first in a long
line of

adversaries

of

such dualism.

He maintained that

the

belief that there is a 'real' world that lurks behind the veil of
what appears to our minds is mistaken. Mach rejected the view
that

there

Instead,
sounds,

is

another

every

object

temperatures,

realm behind our
has
odors,

sensory
mass,

sensory

experiences.

characteristics;

etc.

colors,

For Mach the physical

world and the objects in it are nothing other than complexes of
such sense data. A chair is nothing more than a collection of the
sensory qualities of color, shape, feel, etc. In Mach's word's,
"Bodies do not produce sensations, but complexes of sensations
make up bodies."6
Groupings of sensations that regularly appear together or
that "cohere strongly,"7 comprise what Mach calls items;

items

6 Ernst Mach, The Analysis of Sensations (Chicago: Open
Court, 1902); quoted in Robert P. deVries, "The Place of Hayek's
Theory of Mind and Perception in the History of Philosophy and
Psychology," Havek, Co-ordination and Evolution: His Legacy in
P_h_llosoohv^ __Eo1itics, Economics and the History of Ideas ed. Jack
Birner and Rudy Van Zijp (London: Routledge, 1994), 316-317.
7 Ibid.,

317.
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which we often identify with labels such as star, atom or chair.
This

position

is

called

"neutral monism."8 "Monism"

sensory data are the on ly elements
because

sensations

in the universe.

are neither physical

because

"Neutral"

or mental.

There

is

simply a one to one correspondence between the sensory qualities
of

the

physical

world

and

our

sensations

of

these

characteristics. Reality and our perception of it, argues Mach,
are comprised of ontologically homogeneous elements.
Hayek's The Sensory Order takes its starting point with Mach’s
universe

of

sensory

characteristics.

Like

Mach,

Hayek

distinguishes between the singular and the plural: The singular
consists of the sensory element itself; the plural consists of
the

grouping of

sensory elements with

each

other.

With this

definition both Hayek and Mach recognize that observation is not
limited to the digestion of singular sensory elements.

Instead,

it entails the event of an active grouping of sensory elements
with each other.
Mach1s views regarding this grouping process, however, are
not

fully

worked

out.

According

to

Hayek,

Mach

does

not

appreciate the implications of the grouping process that oversees
our conscious observations.

Whereas Mach maintains that every

item we observe can be deconstructed into its component sensory
characteristics, Hayek warns that Mach underestimates the ongoing

8 Robert P. deVries, "The Place of Hayek's Theory of Mind
and Perception in the History of Philosophy and Psychology,"
Hayek. Co-ordination and Evolution: His Legacy in Philosophy.
Politics. Economics and the History of Ideas ed. Jack Birner and
Rudy Van Zijp (London: Routledge, 1994), 317.

process

whichsupervises

Indeed,

Hayek

their

points out

ordering

that the

in the

process

by

first
which

place.
sensory

elements are ordered is embedded in the very observation of an
item. Accordingly, Hayek claims that any conception of the world
must take into

accountour taking of the world to be as we perceive.

In his critique

of Mach's theory of mind it thus becomes

apparent that Hayek accords a central importance to the event of
organizing sense data.
of innumerable

Indeed, Hayek explains that in the chaos

sensory experiences,

things do not have

self-

evident meaning. Things have "meaning only within a given order
[of] relation[s];"9 relations which our mind imposes on the swirl
of our sensory experiences. With this recognition Hayek begins
his

discussion

or

the

complex

construction

of

human

understanding.
Comprehension,

for Hayek, does not begin with the sensory

event at hand. Comprehension,

rather, is forged by the connection,

the "linkage"10 of new sensory information,

optical,

acoustical

and otherwise, to previous sensory experiences. That is to say,
the

mind

operates

by

assembling

new

sensory

data

into

associations with our accumulated inventory of knowledge or, more

9 Friedrich Hayek, The Sensory Order (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1952), 4-5.
10 Friedrich Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," The
Essence of Hayek ed. Chiaki Nishiyama and Kurt Leube (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1984), 229.
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precisely with our mnemonic archive.11 Hayek explains:
the apparatus by means of which we learn about the
external world is itself the product of a kind of
experience. It is shaped by the conditions prevailing
in the environment in which we live, and it
represents a kind of generic reproduction of the
relations between the elements of this environment
which we have experienced in the past.12
Theresult of this process is a network of "links"
the

Hayekcalls

"sensory order,"13 an order which enableseachindividual

to

navigate through storm of sensory information.
The

process

of

comprehension

thus does

not

begin

with

particular sensations, but precedes them; it operates on previous
sensory events which organize them into a pattern which becomes
the basis for

their mental significance. "We may express

also," explains
function

of

Hayek,

mind or

"by stating that
consciousness,

experience
but

that

this

is not
mind

a

and

consciousness are rather products of experience."14 Since sensory
experience precedes understanding in this way, Hayek argues that
1:1 This connectionist model seems to have some basis in
modern neuroscience. Neuroscientists maintain that neural
connections are worn by experiences, especially recurrent or
traumatic experiences. What results is a process called long term
potentiation or L TP. The LTP process involves a change in the
efficiency of synaptic transmissions along pathways that link
neurons— in other words, electrochemical signals travel more
easily along LTP pathways. According to this theory these
electrochemical pathways connecting neurons possess a class of
postsynaptic excitatory amino acid receptors known as NMDAs. NMDA
receptors are activated each time the brain is confronted by a
sensory event. Over time the receptivity of neurons with worn
NMDA is enhanced. The ability of the brain to comprehend sensory
information is thus shaped by the historical paths seared into
the neural network.
12 Hayek, Philosophical Consequences," 225.
13 ibid.
24 Ibid.,

226.

meaning is not given but invented. The attributes of a given sensory event

are not intrinsic qualities that are somehow "communicated"15 to
the mind.

Rather,

"link" it

to things external and prior to it.

things

before

comprehended

is

to understand something is

they

are

merely

comprehended.

the

by-product

to relate

Sense is brought to

As
of

it or

such,
the

what

is

constructive

activity of the human mind rather than an objective reality given
to it by the world. Indeed, Hayek purposes that:
...the classification of events in the external world
effected by our senses proves not to be a 'true'
classification,
i.e. not one which enables us
adequately to describe the regularities in this
world,
and...the
properties
which our
senses
attribute
to these events
are not
objective
properties of these individual events, but merely
attributes defining the classes which our senses assign
them. ..16
Accordingly, says Hayek,

"the fact that the world which we know

seems wholly an orderly world" is not the result of a translucent
logos,

but

it."17 If

"merely aresult of the method by which we perceive
logos were self-evident there would

be no hesitation

regarding meaning; the order of our ideas would simply conform to
the order of things,

doubt would be eliminated and we would

possess knowledge for all eternity. On the contrary, Hayek does
not

view

knowledge

intelligibility

as

arrived

a

ubiquitous

at through

the

logic

but

domestication

as

an

of

our

ibid.
16 Hayek, The Sensory Order. 173. Emphasis added.
17 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 235. Emphasis
added.

9

sensory experiences. Knowledge is only the aftermath of this ongoing
process.
This emphasis on the notion that we construct our objects
of

knowledge

by

actively

organizing

or

sense

experiences

distinguishes Hayek's theory of mind from that of John Locke.
Indeed, for Hayek, we initiate knowledge by bringing meaning to our
environment,

but

Locke

holds

perception,

one that states

furnish

us

with

objects

causing

knowledge

an

essentially

causal

theory of

"that the way in which the senses
of nature

is by

the

qualities

ideas in our minds."18 To put this

of

distinction

another way, the Lockean view of the relationship between subject
and object can be represented by a receiving antenna into which
external

reality— albeit

distorted— is

intaken;

whereas

in

Hayek's view of the subject and object relationship, the activity
of

knowing

can

be

represented by

a broadcast

antenna

which

transmits an order onto the media of the world around us.
either

case

sources;

the

initiation

for Locke

of knowledge

knowledge proceeds

flows

In

from opposite

from the external,

for

Hayek knowledge proceeds from the internal.
Hayek's un-Lockean constructivism nevertheless points to a
definitively Nietzschean theory of mind.

Like Hayek,

Nietzsche contends that "No event exists in itself.

Friedrich
Everything

that happens consists of a group of phenomena that are gathered and

John Dunn, Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1984), 78. Emphasis added.
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selected. . ."19 and knowledge is "nothing more than this:

Something

strange" which can be connected or "traced back to something
known

by

the

senses."20

Both

comprehension is constructed.

thinkers

thus

recognize

that

It consists of creating coherence

through the use of associations so that the tempest of sensory
events

can

Otherwise,
order

organized

into

various

as William James points out,

our

sensory

successive
receives

be

moment

whatever

experiences,
of

experience

nourishment

we
as

that

forms

patterns.

if we were unable to

would
a

and

simply

sea-anemone

washes

by.

get
on

But

a

each
reef

through

ordering we harness our sensory experiences and drive them to our
pragmatic ends.21
Since sense is something grafted onto the abyss of sensory
experiences Nietzsche,

like Hayek,

argues that meaning is not

self-evident, but something that is constructed,

something that

is brought to things before they are comprehended. As Nietzsche
explains,

"man finds in things nothing but what he himself has

imported into them"22 and "There are no 'facts-in-themselves, ' for

19 Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke. Grossoktavauscrabe. 2nd ed.
ed. Kroner (Leipzig: Kroner, 1901-1913 and 1926), XII, § 2;
quoted in Jean Granier, "Nietzsche's Conception of Chaos," The
New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation ed. David B.
Allison (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994). 135. Emphasis partially
added.
20 Friedrich Nietzsche; quoted in A Nietzsche Reader trans.
and ed. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin, 1977), § 40.
21 William James, Some Problems of Philosophy (New York,
Longmans, 1940), 51.
22 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power trans. Walter
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), §
60 6. Emphasis added.
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always be p ro jected

a sense must

into them before

they can be

'facts."'23 The compatibility of Hayek's connectionist theory of
mind with Nietzsche's, however, does not end here. Connectionism
leads both thinkers to four common conclusions: that the mind is
self-referential, that error is a condition of the mind, that the
mind is in a perpetual state of becoming, and that a portion of
the mind is hidden from the conscious self.
A.

SELF-REFERENTIALISM

As we have seen, Hayek contends that the mind is a weave of
new and old sensory data in a network of connections or "links"
called the "sensory order." This network, he maintains, involves
past

sensory

information to which new sensory information

is

connected; i.e. sensory data has significance insofar as it shows
a certain regularity in appearance to things we have experienced
in the past. The implication of this process is that each sensory
event

is colored by experiences

particular

"linkage"

which

is

which are not a part of the

occurring,

but

shaped by what

exists within the web of one's prior experiences. As a result of
this process, understanding cannot be broken down in to component
sensory events. Each sensory event's identity is defined not by
itself as a discrete unit,

but by its interrelations to other

sensory events, events which are not occurring. They are "linked"
with one another in such a way that they actually determine what
each

one

is

through

their

interconnections.

Our

sensory

experiences are thus not singular in nature. Instead, each bit of

23 ibid.,

§ 556. Emphasis added.
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sensory experience is intertwined with the numerous other bits of
sensory information that comprise our personal history i.e. all
sensation

are

embedded

in

a

complex

of

relations

to

other

sensations; there is only sensory information in intersubjective
relations with other sensory information, there essence lies in
their relation to the others and their interpenatration of the
same.

Ultimately,

where

one part

ends

and another begins

is

undecidable. The mind, concludes Hayek, "is a polycentric order,
that is...its actions are determined by the relation and mutual
adjustment to each other of the [multiple] elements of which it
consists."24
As

with

all

wholes

that

are

subject

to

such

intersubjectivity, no sensory experience is insular or autonomous
or,

as

Umberto

different

when

Eco
it

might

isconnected

changes the perspective"
every voice,

put

it,

a

to

another.

so that

every word written

Jaques

might call
Hayek

"traces"

concludes

becomes

"The connection

or spoken has more than its

it tells a s e c r e t ." 25

Consequently,

event

"every detail of the world,

literal meaning,
Derrida

sensory

that

It "resonates” with what
of
the

something "other."26
"sensory

order"

will

"remain forever in a realm of its own...we shall never be able

24 Friedrich Hayek, Studies in Philosophy. Politics and
Economics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), 73.
25 Umberto Eco, Foucault’s Pendulum trans. William Weaver
(New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1989), 378. Emphasis in
original.
t
Jaques Derrida, Of Grammatoloqy trans. Gayatri Spivak
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), passim.
oc

13

fully to explain or to

'reduce'

[it]

to something else."27 We

shall never be able to refer to sensory data in a purely selfcontained

or

singular

way,

nor

be

able

to

describe

sensory

experiences in a complete manner.
Hayek's

contention

that

sensory

experiences

are

not

discrete, but always inherently plural corresponds to Nietzsche's
claim that our sensory experiences cannot be reduced to singular
events. "If I remove," he writes, "all the relationships, all the
properties...of a thing, the thing does not remain over,"28 once
"one removes other 'things,' then a thing has no properties," no
context and, therefore,

no meaning.29 For Nietzsche then, there

is no such thing as sensory data in itself. Rather, there is only
sensory

data

in

relations

with

other

implication of this understanding is that

sensory

data.

The

sensory experiences

cannot be analyzed irrespective of the other contents of the mind
which contains them.

Under this view,

in order to describe a

sensory experience all the way through you must describe its
relations to other bits of information which in turn are related
to further bits, and so on in an infinite regress. Logically, any
attempted description of a sensory experience would thus have to
take into consideration the complete order that arises from each
person's previous sensory experiences.

27 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 251.
28 Nietzsche, The Will to Power. § 558.
29 Ibid., § 557.
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Conceiving of the mind as a whole in this way implies that
"what

we

know

an

any

moment

about

the

external

world

is

determined by the order of the apparatus of classification which
has been built up by pre [vious] sensory linkages."30 That is to
say,

"we interpret any new event in the environment

in light

o f ... experience."31 Since each person's experience is uniquely
conditioned by what precedes it in their specific life,

every

sensory

one's

experience

experiential

is

not

background.

order," in other words,

uniform,

Our

it

cognitive

is

relative

template

to

or

"sensory

is biographical or, more figuratively,

historically finger-printed. Under this view, question like "What
is X?" has strict meaning only within relation to the perceiver's
unique historical experience. This leads Hayek to the conclusion
that each person's capacity for understanding is distinct from
all others. Just as there are no two identical snowflakes, there
are no two identical

sensations

of a snowflake.

Instead,

all

knowing is historical and all histories are unique.
In

underlining

the

historicity

of

knowledge,

Hayek

concludes that the world we perceive is only "an interpretation
based on the experience of the individual"32 or similarly, "every
sensation,

even

the

'purest, '

must. . .be

regarded

as

an

interpretation of an event in light of the past experience of the

28 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 227.
31 Ibid., 225.
32 Hayek, The Sensory Order,

42.
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i n d i v i d u a l . " 33

Indeed,

Hayek

poses

a scenario

in

which

an

archaeologist discovers an item and cannot discern whether it is
a manmade artifact or a product of nature that by chance appears
to be an artifact.

With respect to this scenario Hayek claims

that:
There is no way of deciding this but by trying to
understand the working of the mind of prehistoric
man, of attempting to understand how he would have
made
such an implement...[but ultimately our
archaeologist] interprets what he sees in terms of
the workings of his own mind."34
Such

self-referentialism

conforms

to

a

distinctively

Nietzschean approach to knowledge. Like Nietzsche, Hayek claims
that we understand everything in light of our previous sensory
experiences.

Indeed,

we are like historians confronted with a

collection of documents which must be interpreted. Although the
documents may suggest some hypotheses, the data must be organized
in order to arrive at a explanation of the past that has some
coherence.

There

is,

however,

an

intermediary

sphere between

historian and document, subject and object, a sphere occupied by
our previous experiences. Understanding is thus mediated by the
specific

experiences

of the historian/observer.

As

a result,

reports Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche maintains that "All knowledge is
an interpretation of being provided by a living and cognizing
sub ject... Thus
unconditioned,

conceived truth
and

is not

absolutely

something

universal.

independent,

Rather

it

33 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 22 6.
34 Friedrich Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science:
Studies in the Abuse of Reason (Indianapolis: Liberty Press,
197 9), 46. Emphasis added.
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inextricably involved with the being of the living subject and
the

world

Nietzsche,

that

he

"facts

has

constructed.1,35 In

are

precisely

what

other

there

words,

says

not,

only

is

interpretations."36
Conversely,

we cannot interpret what our experience does

not provide us a "link" to. Indeed, according to Hayek,

"We can

only know such kinds of events as show a degree of regularity in
their occurrence in relations with others"37 already in our mind
or,

as

Nietzsche

puts

it,

"nobody

can

get

more

out

of

things...for what one lacks access to experience one will have no
ear . " 38

In

short,

a

sensory event

which

has

no

relation

anything previously perceived can not be comprehended.
within our historical net, explains Nietzsche,

to

We sit

"...and whatever

we may catch in it, we can catch nothing at all except that which
allows itself to be caught in precisely our net."39
Self-referentialism is thus a common theme to both authors.
To be sure, Nietzsche admits that he has no right to claim to
have understood his mentor: "I am far from believing that I have

35 Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the
Understanding of His Philosophical Activity trans. Charles F.
Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmitz (Tuscon: The University of
Arizona Press, 1965), 184-185.
36 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, § 481.
37 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 235.
38 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo trans. Walter Kaufmann
(New York: Vintage, 1967), 261.
39 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the
Prejudices of Morality trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), § 117. Emphasis in original.
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truly

understood

Schopenhauer,

rather

it

is

only

through

Schopenhauer I have learned to understand myself a little better"40
and

elsewhere

understands

how

he

comments,

much

these

"I

assume

truths

are

that

everyone

only— m y

now

truths."41

Similarly, Hayek claims:
My gain from hearing or reading what other people
thought was that it changed, as it were, the colors
of m y own concepts. What I heard or read did not
enable me to reproduce their thought but altered my
thought. I would not retain their ideas or concepts
but modify the relations between my own.42
Furthermore,

Hayek asserts that it is possible to "understand

only what is similar to our own mind, it necessarily follows that
we must be able to find all that we can understand in our own
mind."43 In other words, knowledge arises from a latent capacity
that exists antecedent to comprehension. A sensory experience unique
in all its aspects, therefore, will be utterly incomprehensible;
information is only intelligible when it can be associated with
that which is bekannt or already familiar to us.

Consequently,

concludes Hayek, "much that we believe to know about the external

40 Friedrich Nietzsche, Gesammelte Werke, Musarionausqabe
23 vols. (Munich: Musarion Verlag, 1920-1929), § 7:140; quoted in
Leslie Paul Thiel, Friedrich Nietzsche and The Politics of the
Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990), 35. Emphasis added.
41 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil trans.
Marianne Cowen (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966), § 231.
Emphasis in original.
42 Friedrich Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics,
Economics and the History of Ideas (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1978), 52-53. Emphasis added.
43 Friedrich Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order
(London: Henley and Routledge, 1949), 68. Emphasis added.
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world is, in fact, knowledge about ourselves;" it is a disclosure
of who one is historically.44
B.

ERROR

AS

A

CONDITION

OF

THE

MIND

Given the constructed nature of knowledge, Hayek maintains
that there is no basis to believe that the representation of
physical

reality

which

it

makes

possible

is

an

accurate

representation of the world as it is. Each mind functions,

he

says, through a recognition of what is similar to that mind at
the expense of what is particular to that item. "What we perceive
of the external world," says Hayek,
are never all the properties which a particular
object can be said to possess objectively, not even
only some of the properties which these objects in
fact do possess physically, but always only certain
'aspects,' relations to other kinds of objects which
we assign to all elements of the classes in which we
place
the perceived objects.
This may
often
compromise relations which objectively do not at all
belong to the particular object but which we merely
ascribe to it as a member of the class in which we
place it as a result of some accidental collection of
circumstances in the past.45
In other words,

our

observations

are

illusory.

Our

"sensory

order" is not a strict catalogue of empirical representations,
but an abstracted collection of similarities and connections, of
incomplete representations which do not capture the full detail
of things. As A.E Galeotti summarizes this point, "We do not know
tokens, but kinds."46 Nevertheless, our "sensory order" comprises

44 Hayek, The .Sensjary O rder, 6.
45 Ibid., 143.
4*> A.E. Galotti, "Individualism, Social Rules, Tradition:
The Case of Friedrich Hayek," Political Theory (May 1987), 170.
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the vary mechanism through which we interpret new experiences and
are able to interact with our environment at all.
Since what we experience is abstracted, Hayek argues that
we must "divest” ourselves "of the habitual assumption that all
we have learned from experience must be true... knowledge based
entirely on experience may be entirely false."47 Moreover, since
knowledge must always refer to abstracted "elements which are
defined by certain relations with other elements," knowledge is
ultimately be

based

on the

"assumption

that

these

relations

actually exist."48 In short, Hayek questions the authenticity of
the image that our mind presents to us because only a selection
of what we are observing is being ordered. Hence, he argues, our
knowledge of the surrounding environment is duplicitous and we
should

not

dogmatize

it;

hold

all

you

positions

open

to

criticism, he says, even this one.49
This
subject

skepticism

of knowledge.

reflects

a Nietzschean

Like Hayek,

Nietzsche

approach to the
claims that

"The

entire apparatus of knowledge is an apparatus for abstraction and
simplification"50 Our mind attempts "to subsume, to schematize,
for the purpose of intelligibility"51 and "Everything of which we

4^ Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 228.
48 Ibid., 232.
4^ Gerard Radnitzky, "The Evolution of the Extended Order:
Reflections on Hayek's Theory and its Political Implications,"
Organization and Change in Complex Systems ed. Marcelo Alonso
(New York: Paragon House, 1990), 184.
50 Nietzsche, The Will to Power. § 503.
51 Ibid., § 515.

become

conscious

interpreted

is

through

arranged,
and

simplified,

through."52

This

schematized,

abstraction,

he

continues, results in a kind of deception, a lie, an error which
does

not

contain the essences

of things.

As

one

commentator

summarizes Nietzsche's view, all our knowledge is an "illusion"
because our observations are incomplete,

they do not penetrate

into the essences of things.53 Our observations,

in short,

are

falsehoods. As Nietzsche puts it, "That which we now call the world

is the result of a host of errors
gradually

and phantasies

accumulated."54 Knowledge

is,

which have

moreover,

only

the

"measuring of earlier and later errors by one another," of the
mind's organization of inaccuracies.55 Consequently,

Nietzsche

remarks that the order which we find in the world allows us to
pragmatically function it, but it "does not prove them. Life is
no argument. The conditions of life... include error."56
Nietzsche
neither
reality.

and

a passive
Instead,

Hayek

thus

receptacle
our

mind

both
nor

an

agree

that

the

mind

unblemished mirror

abstracts

and

falsifies

is
for
our

surroundings so that we can pragmatically function in the world.

52 Ibid., § 477.
53 Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding
of His Philosophical Activity. 185.
54 Nietzsche; quoted in Jaspers. Nietzsche: An Introduction
to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity, 186.
55 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, § 520.
56 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), § 121.
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Indeed,

Hayek

condition

of

argues

that

pragmatic

untruth

human

argues that our incomplete

or

abstraction

activity.

Similarly,

is

a pre

Nietzsche

"Truth is a kind of error without

which a definite species of living being cannot live."57 Hayek
and Nietzsche evidently recognize the primacy of practice over
accuracy in the construction of human mind.
Since error is a condition of the mind, both thinkers are
ultimately led to doubt that humans are capable of apprehending
elementary or pure sensations from which we can form a foundation
for human knowledge. Because everything we understand undergoes
selection and ordering, the resulting map or model we form of the
world is in no important respect grounded in the basis of sheer
sense data,
stigmatize

themselves incorruptible. Both thinkers,
the

natural objects

Lockean

view that

our

sensory

in short,

experience

"of

correspond in some strong fashion to the way

natural objects actually are."58 Rather, the picture we form of
the world emerges straight from our interaction with the world,
and

it

is

always

abstract

in

integrating

things

among

the

infinite aspects which it contains.
Since we cannot separate our means of perception, our mind,
from that

which

is being perceived,

we have no other way of

observing the world, i.e. "we behold all things through the human

57 Nietzsche; quoted in Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction
t£>__the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity. 18 6.
58 Dunn, Locke. 78.

22

head and cannot cut off this head."59 There is no unmediated
vantage point from which this knowledge can be gained, for such a
vantage

point

implies

a possibility

not

granted

to

us;

the

possibility of transporting ourselves outside of our existence so
as to objectively behold it. Instead, participation in existence
is our only window unto the world.

We cannot escape from our

cognitive template, our "sensory order's" lense, so as to attain
a presuppositionless or unsituated perspective on the world as a
whole in itself. Our mind's ordering principles "are the basis
for all our

judgments and

'knowledge'— there is absolutely no

escape, no backway or bypath in to the real world ."60 The vary means
by which we observe the world intervenes in what we can observe
and although we can reflect on aspects of our sense experiences,
we must realize that reflection is always secondary and cannot
stand independent to sense experience itself.
The belief that there is an objective viewpoint which gives
an accurate account of the world,

concludes Hayek,

thus "must

break down."61 No such world is accessible. Our view of the world
is unavoidably mediated by the very means by which we view it or,
as Nietzsche

analogizes,

humans are like creatures with their

backs to reality and a mirror before them. No matter how close to
the edge of the mirror they go their view of the whole of the

59 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book For
Free Spirits trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), § 9.
Nietzsche, Daybreak, § 117. Emphasis in original.
61 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 233.
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reality behind them will always be mediated by their own eye.
"Why does man not see things?" he asks, because "He is himself
standing in the way."62
That we cannot

achieve an unmediated view of the world

leads Hayek to conclude that the historical aim of philosophy to
develop

a transcendental metaphysics

objective

of

philosophy

cannot

be

must

be

abandoned.

the

formulation

The
of

a

metaphysical system, but rather the investigation of the limits
of human knowledge. Moreover,

says Hayek,

such an investigation

must be reflexive since, in the end, all philosophical inquiry is
immanent inquiry. Hayek is Nietzschean then in repudiating the
belief that metaphysics can expose the essences or natures of
things.

Against Mach and other positivists

Hayek

rejects

the

belief that there is available to us "immaculate perception"63 or
pure sensations which can contribute to an objective picture of
the

world.

Instead,

presuppositions.

everything

we

observe

is

imbued

with

The notion that there are pristine sensations

which "involve some direct communication of properties of the
external

objects,

atoms or elements"

or...[which]

constitute

irreducible

mental

is worthless because of the vary "lack of

meaning of these hypotheses."64 Moreover, Hayek is emphatic that
"the conception of an original pure core of sensations... is an
62 Nietzsche, Daybreak. § 438.
63 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book For
Everyone and No One trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin,
1969), 144.
64 Hayek, The Sensory Order. 165.
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entirely unnecessary fiction."65 Our view of the world, rather,
is mediated by our mind's ability to sort through the chaos of
the infinite number of stimuli that can be perceived and create
order where none exists so as to make the world intelligible.
Dependence on our mind's abstracted ordering thus

leads

both Hayek and Nietzsche to deny that we can know how things are
in the world. We can only know how our mind orders our sensory
experiences. In other words, both thinkers assert that we do not
observe a translucent representation of the world ding an sich, 66
rather,

our

impossible

minds
to

impose

observe

the

an a priori pattern
supposed

things

on
that

it making
lurk

it

behind

appearances.
This

intersection

with

Kant,

however,

should

not

be

exaggerated. Although all three thinkers similarly recognize that
objects of cognition are synthetic,
further.

Hayek

and

Nietzsche,

on

Kant is alone in going no
the

other

hand,

espouse

a

emergent theory of the mind. They not only argue that the objects
of cognition

are man-made,

but

that

they are

fluid in their

character; i.e. they change. Hayek and Nietzsche thus distinguish
themselves from Kant in their view that the phenomenal image our
mind presents to us is in motion.
C . THE

BECOMING

OF

THE

MIND

Given our movements through time and space Hayek argues
that the contents of our "sensory order" are not fixed data. The

65 Ibid., 42.
66 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason trans. N.K.
Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), passim.
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things we know are but the result of the connecting activity of
the mind as it orders experiences and is modified continuously by
experience.
each

Our "sensory order," in other words,

additional

sensory

experience;

its

evolves with

contents

and

the

relations between them are continually being updated with the
introduction of each new bit of sensory information.

Occasions

arise, however, when our network of connections does not provide
a ready binding point for a new experience.

In this case,

our

"sensory order" is compelled to reorder so as to assimilate the
new

experience.

Such

an

event

"forces

us

to

revise

[our]

classification[s]" to incorporate inconsistent experiences and
make pragmatic adaptations to the world that we inhabit.67 Hayek
conceives

the

spontaneously
modifies

human

mind

reprograms

itself

then
to

like

a

sorting

incorporate

so as to reclassify what

new

device

that

experiences;

it

would otherwise be

meaningless information. Such reordering occurs whenever existing
orders are disappointed by new experience. These inconsistencies
are overcome when the experience that was formerly treated as a
member of an unknown set is synthesized into a new set that
encompasses both new and old events. Reordering is thus performed
when regularities are reshuffled and a principle of connection is
discovered that explains both new and old sensory experiences.
Such a process is analogous to learning. Indeed, consider Robert
deVries'

linguist metaphor:68 Suppose that someone with little

Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 228.
deVries, "The Place of Hayek's Theory of Mind and
Perception in the History of Philosophy and Psychology," 320-321.
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formal education, but lots of curiosity began to contemplate the
linear order of sentences. This hypothetical person notices the
following regularities:
John has called his sister.
Peter can buy a bicycle
People won't die.
and
Has John called his sister?
Can Peter buy a bicycle?
Won't people die?
What

does

our

aspiring

linguist

do?

He

sees

the

following

regularity: statements can be altered into questions by reversing
the order of the first two words of a sentence.
But

then

our

would-be

linguist

encounters

some

new

experiences that falsify this pattern of regularities.
The big house is cheap.
People without lungs will die.
and
Is the big house cheap?
Will people without lungs die?
If his pattern of regularities were applied the above questions
would have the following syntactic form:
Big the house is cheap?
Without people lungs will die?
Since these questions are meaningless, our linguist's principles
of organization no longer account for his experience i.e.

the

first and second words of a sentence are demonstrated not to be
the

fundamental elements

realization

occurs

our

of the grammatical
linguist

world.

is compelled to

When this

reorder

his

linguistic universe to behave pragmatically in his relations with
the

external

world.

He may

then

notice

a second

patten

of
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regularities, one that states that sentences can be changed into
questions by reversing the order of the object and the finite
verb. This second pattern would not only have explained his old
experiences had he held it before, but it also explains his new
experiences. Such a reordering of experiences is analogous to the
process

Hayek claims

spontaneously transpires

in the

"sensory

order" when old systems of connection are reconstituted.
This emphasis on the continual motion of the mind in light
of new experience echoes Nietzsche's belief that the human mind
is in a state of becoming.
recognition that

Indeed,

Nietzsche is clear in his

the human mind is an evolving phenomena.

He

explains:
The power of the mind to absorb foreign elements
reveals itself in the strong tendency to make the new
like the old. to simplify the manifold...its purpose
is the incorporation of new "experiences," the adding
of new material to old, its growth. .. Really, the mind
is more like a stomach than anything else."69
Yet, unlike Hayek, Nietzsche is not explicit in his recognition
of cognitive reordering. What Nietzsche does say is that we seek
to

"master the chaos one is, to compel one's chaos to become

form."70 What exactly this "mastering" entails is not made clear.
He does mention, however, that man "is that which must overcome
itself

again

and

again."71 Whether

or not

this

implies

the

reordering of our sensory data to "incorporate new 'experiences'"
69 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil § 230. Emphasis in
original.
70 Nietzsche, Will to Power, § 842.
71 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 138. Emphasis
removed.
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is not stated. Nevertheless, Nietzsche does claim that the mind
evolves. He explains: "We ourselves keep growing, keep changing,
we shed our old bark, we shed our skins every spring...we are no
to be

longer free to do only one particular thing,

only one

particular thing."72
In

any

case,

regarding

the

human

mind

both

Hayek

and

Nietzsche see continual motion. They agree that our mind's view
of the world is in a constant process of temporal change. Indeed,
Hayek asserts, the phenomenal world we perceive is not constant,
but

"incessantly changing."73 Similarly,

Nietzsche states that

"all our doing and knowing is not a succession of facts...but a
continuous

flux."74 In other words, both thinkers subscribe to

the view that the contents of the human mind are in a discursive
state of becoming.
mind, however,

Of central importance to both theories of

is that this process is ultimately unknowable to

the conscious self.
D.

Some

thinkers,

existence of a

THE

such

UNKNOWN

as

Karl

SELF

Popper,

acknowledge

'submerged' portion of the mind,

the

but they deny

that this disturbs the unity and continuity of the self.

They

contend, rather, that the unconscious aspects of the mind can be

7?

•

'*• Nietzsche, The Gay Science, § 371. Emphasis in original.

73 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 234.
74 Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Wanderer and His Shadow,"
H u m a n f All Too Hu man , § 11.
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"recalled" or accessed from the surface of consciousness.75 Hayek
and Nietzsche

are not

convinced.

Both thinkers maintain that

everything that is "made conscious...belongs only to the surface,
the skin which,

like any skin reveals something but conceals even

more!"76 Indeed, they contend that much of our cognitive activity
is hidden beyond the scope of self-conscious introspection.
In order to understand what Hayek and Nietzsche mean when
they claim that a portion of the self is hidden, we must begin
with their shared belief that "that which becomes conscious is
involved in causal relations which are entirely withheld from us."77
According to both thinkers, there is a process which orders the
contents of our consciousness,

but which is beyond our self-

awareness.

subject to the workings

evolving

We are,
cognitive

experiences

they argue,
framework

which

organizes

into our conscious mind and which

everything to which our mind refers,

our

of an

sensory

is implicit

in

but which is nonetheless

introspectively inaccessible to our conscious mind.
It is important to recognize the precise sense in which
Hayek and Nietzsche maintain that a portion of the self is " entirely
withheld " from us. A claim that we can know the cognitive processes

which result

in our conscious mind would mean that

we could

arrive at a substantive explanation of why we hold the views we
do and how we know what we know.

In such a case the conditions

75 Karl Popper, The Self and Its Brain. Part I ( New York:
Springer-International, 1977), 129-131.
76 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. § 32. Emphasis added.
77 Nietzsche, The Will to Power. § 524. Emphasis added.
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would be favorable for deliberately directing our consciousness.
We

could on

successfully
conclusion,
Cartesian

the basis
direct

our

however,
self,

of

of our conscious

this

would entail positing the presence

of a

free

mind’s

activity.

floating

To

be able to
make

a

own

knowledge

consciousness

independent of the precursory workings

which

is

of our becoming mind.

Hayek and Nietzsche reject the possibility of such an autonomous
engineer of consciousness, such a Cartesian self.
In Hayek's view, that which we call the conscious mind is
generated from the micro-level interactions or connections of new
and old sensory information.
micro-level

activity

has

The mind which arises

itsroot

therein,

and

from this
it emerges

therefrom, but does not belong to it. It instead constitutes a
new order of complexity which cannot describe in reverse its own
construction. In other words, we can no more recursively describe
how our conscious mind was arrived at than can tell from the
number 5 that it was arrived at from 2 + 3 ,
an

infinite

number

of

7-2

other calculations;

or any other of

thisinformation

resides on a different level of complexity— one which governs the
order of numbers or minds, but which is not demonstrable from the
level of numbers or minds themselves. Based on this description
of the mind, Hayek argues that there is a terra incognita of the self;
the process which orders the contents of our conscious mind is
beyond our self-conscious capacity to know.

There is in other

words, "on every level or in every universe of discourse, a part
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of our knowledge which although it is the result of experience,
cannot be controlled by experience.”78
In this

respect,

our mind encounters

some

of the .same

limitations as an "executive routine” of a computer program; i.e.
consciousness arises from a process which arranges,

simplifies,

and schematizes the contents of our minds, but like an "executive
routine" we do not have access to the process which oversees the
ordering of this

information.

For an example,

the

"executive

routines" of current chess-playing programs do not have access to
the principle of play employed by the software, but only to the
"summary

judgment"

of

its

"move

evaluator."

This

"summary

judgment" is a numerical quantity which represents the result of
the program's

application of its principle of play,

yet

this

"summary judgment" conveys no information back to the "executive
routine"

regarding

the

process

by

which

it

was

derived.

An

"executive routine" thus does not directly consider the principle
upon which it functions.79 It instead operates on the basis of
the

results

of

its

"summary

judgment."

Like

a chess-playing

program, the conscious mind is ordered by a process which cannot
be

accessed

or

self-consciously

explicated.

Indeed,

Hayek

contends that the mind is ordered by a process which we cannot
consciously articulate— we only have access to the consequences
of our "summary judgments." The mind,

in short,

is subject to a

7® Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 229.
79 Daniel Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on
Mind and Psychology (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1981), 150-151.
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process which operates on the contents of consciousness but which
cannot itself be consciously known.
It is important to realize, however, that this analogy is
not

fully

appropriate.

Unlike

chess

playing

software

the

unconscious process Hayek speaks of does not consist of innate or
Platonic

ideas

which

are

preprogrammed

into

human

beings.

Instead, he argues that the connective process is incidental. It
simply refers to how the ongoing micro-level interactions of past
and

incoming

sensory experiences

spontaneously determine

the

overall order of the contents of our conscious mind.
Hayek warns us, moreover, that just because these micro
level connective processes occur on an unconscious level that
they should not be characterized as "sub-conscious." He puts this
point clearly when he explains that "it is generally taken for
granted that in some sense conscious experience constitutes the
'highest' level in the hierarchy of mental events, and that what
is not conscious has remained 'sub-conscious' because it has not
yet risen to that level."80 Indeed,

Hayek does not doubt that

many mental processes through which stimuli evoke actions do not
become conscious because they proceed on literally too low a
level,

"but this is no justification for assuming that all the

[cognitive]
conscious

events

determining

experience

action

corresponds

are

to
in

which
this

no

distinct

sense

sub

80 Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics. Economics
and the History of Ideas. 45.
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conscious.”81 Hayek goes on to claim that if his conception is
correct that processes of
which we are not even aware determine the sensory
qualities which we consciously experience, this would
mean that of much that happens in our mind we are not
aware, not because it proceeds at too low a level but
because it proceeds at too high a level. It would
seem more appropriate to call such a process not
'sub-conscious; but 'super-conscious,' because they
govern the conscious process without appearing in
them. This would mean that what we consciously
experience is only part, or the result, of processes
of which we cannot be conscious, because it is only
the multiple classification by the super-structure
which assigns to a particular event that determined
place in a comprehensive order which makes it a
conscious event.82
The point Hayek makes here is that the order which emerges from
the complex interaction of past and present sensory experiences
"seems

never

something

at

to be

the

outcome

which

we

can

of

a conscious

deliberately

aim,

process,
but

not

always

a

discovery of something which already guides its operation.”83 If
this connective activity were consciously accessible,

we could

know the rules upon which our vary thoughts are based. But this,
Hayek argues,
calculate

the

necessarily

is impossible because we cannot self-consciously
activity
refer.

In

to

which

other

all
words,

are
to

conscious
direct

thoughts
our

own

consciousness on a micro-level would "require that we should know
more than we actually do, which is, of course,

81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 46.

a contradictory
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statement.”84 More

importantly,

as a result of this

limit to

introspection, there can be no orchestrating or Cartesian self.
We instead function on the results of our mind's non-conscious
ordering activity.

"Our mental activities are not guided by the

particulars at which they are consciously directed, or of which
the acting mind is aware, but by abstract rules which it cannot
be said to know yet which nevertheless guide it."85
Like Hayek, Nietzsche contends that consciousness is simply
a "shadow" of connective activity that is elsewhere delineated.86
What we experience as consciousness is a symptom of our mind's
ordering of our "thousandfold complexity."87 It is the outcome of
"a multiplicity of subjects whose interaction and struggle is the
basis of our thought and our consciousness."88 Under this view,
everything that enters

consciousness

as a

'unity'

is already

tremendously complex. Hence, Nietzsche sees consciousness not as
a beginning but as an end, the last link of a chain, the verdict
of underlying micro-level activity.
Nietzsche sees consciousness then not as jg//-conscious,
but as an awareness subordinate to an ordering and arranging self
which is not conscious, i.e. it is not a "master" conscious, but

84 Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies in the
Abuse of Reason. 86.
85 Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics. Economics
and the History of Ideas. 39.
88 Nietzsche, The Gay Science. § 179.
87 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, § 523.
88 Ibid., § 490.
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a

"slave”

conscious

in

relation

to

a

"master"

who

is

not

conscious.89 Consciousness arises when a whole is subordinated to
a superior whole. It is born in relation to micro-level cognitive
activity of which consciousness
consciousness,

is the

concludes Nietzsche,

result.

Regarding our

"That a higher court rules

over these things cannot be doubted."90
This view leads Nietzsche to address what is called the
"actor—action"

presumption.91 The

"actor-action"

presumption

holds that actor A wills action B; i.e. actor A brings about action
B.

Such

a distinction places

the

emphasis

on the

deliberate

subject and implies that he/she has some meaningful discretion
over action B. It implies that actor A has the ability to do
otherwise and exercises an independence of action B.
For

Nietzsche,

the

most

important

consequence

of

the

"actor-action" presumption is its overestimation of the conscious
self.

Under

the

'actor-action"

presumption

the

subject

is

separated from his/her acts and given the status of a preeminent
author.

But

qualitatively
already

in

Nietzsche's

separable

arranges,

from

simplifies,

view,
the

consciousness

unconscious

schematizes

and

is

process

not
which

interprets

the

contents of our consciousness. As a result, the unitary subject
does not exist; the

'I' is merely a fiction attributed to the

8 9 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy trans. Hugh
Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 39.
90 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, § 524.
91 Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of
Transfiguration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975),
63-72.
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actor

whose

activity.
sam e

movements

In this sense,

unconscious

are

based

upon

precursory

cognitive

actor and action are the products the

cognitive events. To

say that

actor A wills

action B is then like saying the "lightening flashed;" it simply
states two aspects of the same event and imposes a non-existent
causal relationship between them. With regard to consciousness,
Nietzsche

concludes

that there

is no

deliberate

relationship

between subject and action. We incorrectly believe "ourselves to
be causal

in the

act of willing;"

we

incorrectly believe

an

action’s causes are "to be sought in consciousness;" and, above
all, we incorrectly believe "that the ’I' causes the thought."92
In the end, Nietzsche, like Hayek, destabilizes the notion
of

the

Cartesian

self.

Under

his

view,

"thinking"

necessarily imply the presence of a singularity,

does

not

an "I" which

"thinks." Instead, "thinking" is the by-product of an underlying
multiplicity of cognitive interactions. The self is not a unity,
it is "something com plicated , something that is a unity in word
only."93 A unitary or Cartesian subject is thus not the prime
mover or sovereign architect of human thought. Rather, thought is
a by-product of elementary cognitive operations, operations which
culminate in the form of the conscious self.

92 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, quoted in
Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of
Transfiguration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975),
70-71.
9^ Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, § 19. Emphasis in
original.
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Nietzsche

goes

on to

argue

that

our mind's

elementary

cognitive operations are beyond our capacity to know. Indeed, he
claims

that

the

mind's

"great

principle

activity

is

unconscious”94 and that "by far the greatest part of our spirit's
activity remains unconscious and unfelt."95 That these cognitive
processes are inarticulate, however, is no excuse for dismissing
them as inferior to conscious processes. For Nietzsche, it is an
error to
regard the indistinct idea as a lower kind of idea
than the distinct: but that which removes itself from
our consciousness and for that reason becomes obscure
can on that account be perfectly clear in itself.
Becoming obscure is [only] a matter of perspective of
consciousness.96
For Hayek and Nietzsche then, our behavior is not guided by
a 'declarative' or 'deliberate' self. Rather it is mediated by a
different

system,

one

which

operates

above

our

conscious

awareness. They argue that we do not have introspective access to
these workings and interactions, but only to the consequences—
such as the way we behave and feel. Thus thoughts are conscious
products of a non-conscious process.
that

the

subjective

It is crucial to remember

experience we call the consciousness

is,

therefore, not the primary business of the system which generates
it,

but

shaped

by

intrespectively

inaccessible

process.

Nietzsche, however, does not provide a explicit explanation as to
why we cannot become self-aware of the connective process which

94 Nietzsche, The Gav Science. § 354.
95 Ibid., § 333.
96 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, § 528.
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culminates in our conscious mind— he simply states that it is the
case.

Hayek,

on the other

regarding this

subject

hand,

goes

further than

and effectively

surpasses

Nietzsche

Nietzsche's

theory of mind.
II.

HAYEK'S

IMPROVEMENT ON
THEORY OF MIND

NIETZSCHE'S

Hayek's belief that our connectionist mind is in perpetual
motion leads him to certain important conclusions regarding the
mind's

operation which im prove

Foremost,

Hayek

recognizes

operation— iteration,

on Nietzsche's

three

sensitivity

properties
to

initial

theory of mind.
in

the

mind's

conditions

and

unpredictability— which offer an explanation as to why a portion
of the self

is

"entirely withheld"

from conscious

awareness.

These properties normally occur in what complexity theorists call
"emergent"

phenomena.97 An "emergent" phenomena

phenomena,

such

evolving

orders

components.

an

eco-system

arise

out

or weather

is a natural

pattern,

of a complex array of

in

which

interactive

They are called "emergent" because they are moving

through what physicists call "state space" where a "state point" is

defined as the mathematical conception whose coordinates describe
the state of a phenomena at a given point or snapshot in elapsing
time.98 "State space," however, is not literal or physical space
but something that can be understood by direct analogy.

97 Roger Lewin, Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos (New
York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), 9-14.
9® Steven H. Strogatz and Ian Stewart, "Coupled Oscillators
and Biological Synchronization," Scientific American (December
1993), 103.
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"State space" is a conceptual "space" which contains the
various

aspects

or

"dimensions"

acting upon a phenomena.

For

example,

consider your personal characteristics of age, height,

weight,

hair

occupation.
point

on

color,

gender,

income,

eight

the

of

education

and

Each of these characteristics corresponds to a one
different

charts,

charts

respective range of possible ages,
suppose

level

ranges

of all eight

heights,
charts

which

contain

weights,

could be

simultaneously by a multidimensional space,

etc.

the
Now

represented

and a single point

within that space represents all eight aspects of your character
at a particular moment in time. In this case, your character is
reduced to a single "state point" in multidimensional space, yet
this point

still

contains

all the

information

that

has been

recorded about you. Consider further that as your characteristics
change with time the point representing you appears to meander
within this multidimensional space."
In a major respect, the concept of an "emergent" phenomena
is compatible with Hayek1s notion of the "sensory order." Like an
"emergent" phenomena,

Hayek conceives of cognitive activity as

neither on a continuum nor on a grid, but moving through a "state
space"

which

contains

all

the

dimensions

and

potential

connections of our past, present and future sensory experiences.
Moreover,

the properties

conditions

and

of iteration,

unpredictability

sensitivity to initial

would

account

for

our

99 J. Richard Eiser, Attitudes. Chaos and the Connectionist
Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 225-229.
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connectionist mind's

discursive movement

through

this

"state

space."
A.

ITERATION

The first property Hayek identifies in functioning of our
"sensory order” is iteration. Iteration is the successive process
by which new information is integrated into present and future
frameworks of an ongoing phenomena. In the case of the "sensory
order" this process entails the "linking" of new sensory data
into the present mental network.

But when the "sensory order"

incorporates a bit of sensory data it is itself is altered by
that data; it recontextualizes. In other words our connectionist
mind is like a mental encyclopedia which,

at each successive

moment publishes a revised edition into which the next relevant
entry

is

inserted.

As

a result,

each

new

sensory

event

one

witnesses will be interpreted within the relative context of an
updated network system of connections, one which incorporates the
immediately preceding sensory information.
The
phenomena.

"sensory

order,"

consequently,

is

no t

a timeless

A timeless phenomena is a closed system such as a

collection of musical notes where the possible patterns that can
be played today are identical to the possible patterns that can
be played next week,

next year, next century. But what happens

when the unity is broken and a new note is introduced? The whole
nature

of

possible

permutations

is

changed.

No

possible

permutation of the former set of notes can replicate a sequence
of the new sounds.

The introduction of a new note,

therefore,

dramatically changes the possible outcome of all future melodies.
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Similarly,
information
scenarios.

the

alters

introduction
the

"sensory

of each new bit
order's"

of sensory

possible

future

Indeed, the "sensory order" is perpetually changing.

As one continues this process of weaving new information into the
network,

one's mind not only redefines relations between given

sensory events and other events which are actually observed, but
also between new and old events, and even conjectural relations
between events.
process

Added to this already dynamic picture

of mental

reorganization.

is the

When reorganization occurs,

says Hayek, the configurations of earlier orders are recombined
into

still more

complex configurations.

Each recontextualized

order that then emerges contains within it the earlier orders,
and the events of these orders acquire novel qualities which did
not

exist

in them prior to their

integration within

the new

order. As a consequence of such iteration each contemplation is
unique or, as Heraclitus might put it, you cannot step into the
same stream of thought twice. The structure of the connections in
the mind, explains Hayek,
is modified by every new action exercised upon it by
the external world, and since the stimuli acting on
it do not operate by themselves but always in
conjunction with the process called forth by the pre
existing excitatory state, it is obvious that the
response to a given combination of stimuli on two
different occasions is not likely to be exactly the
same. Because it is the whole history of the organism
which will determine its action, new factors will
contribute to this determination on the later
occasion which were not present in the first. We
shall find not only that the same set of external
stimuli will not always produce the same responses,
but
also
that
altogether new
responses
will

100 Hayek; The Sensory Order. 123.
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B.

SENSITIVITY

TO

INITIAL

CONDITIONS

It is significant that Hayek notes that "there are several
fields

in which practical

difficulties

elaborating known explanations

prevent

us

from thus

of the principle to the point

where they would enable us to predict particular events. This is
often

the

case

when

phenomena

are

very

complex,

as

in

meteorology..."101 Indeed consider the case of MIT meteorologist
Edward

Lorenz.

simulator
dramatic

In

using

1960,

twelve

fluctuations

Lorenz

created

variables.
based

a primitive

Through

on minute

the

weather

observance

variations

in

of

initial

values, Lorenz concluded that long range weather forecasting was
doomed. No one listened, and by the 1980s millions of dollars and
manhours

had

been

spent

supercomputer to predict
stations
variables

was
were

established

in

an

attempt

the weather.
and

the

to

program

a

Cray

A network of measuring

resulting

inputted into the computer.

better than using satellite photographs;

half

a million

The result was no

"beyond two or three

days the world's best forecasts were speculative, and beyond six
or seven days they were worthless."102 But suppose that even more
data could be inputted into the computer.

"[S]uppose the Earth

could be covered with sensors spaced one foot apart,
one foot
Suppose

rising at

intervals all the way to the top of the atmosphere.
every

sensor

gives

perfectly

accurate

readings

-*•01 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 243.
102 James Gleick, Chaos: The Making of a New Science (New
York: Penguin, 1987), 20.
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temperature,

pressure,

humidity

and

any

other

quantity

a

meteorologist would want...The computer will still not be able to
predict whether Princeton, New Jersey will have sun or rain on a
day one month away."103
The

inherent

impossibility

of

such

long-range

weather

forecasting is the result of the fact that wether systems are
extremely sensitive to initial conditions. That is to say, if the
calculated

temperature

inputted

into

a

wether

forecasting

computer is 75.0000*, but the actual temperature is 75.00001*,
then this slight miscalculation in conjunction with others will
evolve over time into prediction-wrecking size. Accordingly, the
lighting of matches

and the opening of refrigerator doors

in

Richmond today would have to be taken into account to accurately
predict the weather in Williamsburg next month.
The human mind's sensitivity to initial conditions is no
different in Hayek's view. Even a slight variation in the initial
condition of your "sensory order" means that you are beginning
from a different point than calculated.
moment

your

understanding

is

Subsequently,

evolving

under

at each

different

circumstances and each new experience carries you further from
what

you

expected.

experiences
complex

may

systems

Moreover,

exhibit
the

large

seemingly

mind

is

collections

of

random behavior.

extremely

sensitive

sensory
Like

to

all

minute

influences. The sight of a familiar face, therefore can trigger
an abrupt shift in the thought pattern and a corresponding shift

103 Ibid.,

21.

44

in one's awareness. For these reasons Hayek claims that we are in
no better position to predict the specific future motions of the
mind than we are "able to predict the shape and movement of [a]
wave that will form on the [surface of the] ocean at a particular
place and moment in time."104
The

role

Hayek1s view,

of minute

variables

thus becomes

important to

especially regarding "'more highly organized'

or

essentially complex phenomena as we encounter in the realms of
life, m ind and society."105 There are, he notes, many examples in
nature

that elucidate

the property of

sensitivity to initial

conditions. For example:
We can never produce a crystal or complex organic
compound by placing the individual atoms in such a
way that they will form a lattice of a crystal or the
system of bezol rings which make up an organic
compound....What does in these instances determine
not only the general character of the crystal or
compound that will be formed but also the particular
position of any one element in them? The important
point is that the regularity of conduct of the
elements will determine the general character of the
resulting order but not all the details of its
particular manifestation. The particular manner in
which the resulting abstract order will manifest
itself will depend, in addition to the rules which
govern the actions of its elements, on their initial
position and on all the particular circumstances of
the immediate environment to which each of them will
react in the course of the formation of that order.
The order,
in other words, will always be an
adaptation to a large number of particular facts
which will not be known in their totality to
anyone...106

Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 243.
105 Friedrich Hayek, Law. Legislation and Liberty: A New
Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political
Economy. Vol. I: Rules and Order (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1973), 41. Emphasis added.
106 Ibid.,

39-40.
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Another

example

from physics

is

in

some

respects

even

more

instructive of Hayek's view on the role of minute influences on
complex phenomena.
In the familiar school experiment in which iron
filings on a sheet of paper are made to arrange
themselves along the lines of force of a magnet
placed below, we can predict the general shape of the
chains that will be formed by the filings hooking
themselves together; but we cannot predict along
which ones the family of an infinite number of such
curves that define the magnetic field these chains
will place themselves. This will depend on
the
position, direction, weight, roughness or smoothness
of each of the iron filings and on all
the
irregularities of the surface of the paper. The
forces emanating from the magnet and from each of the
iron filings will thus interact with the environment
to produce a unique instance of a general pattern,
the general character of which will be determined by
known laws, but the concrete appearance of which will
depend on particular circumstances we cannot fully
ascertain.107
In short, although the general pattern of growth and function of
a complex system might be discovered and predicted, prediction of
sub-patterns are precluded by the impossibility of accumulating
all

the

information

which

contributes

to

its

specific

manifestation.108

107 Ibid.
108 Because Hayek's account of the the properties of the
"sensory order" resemble those we observe in physical phenomena
we are brought to confront his position regarding physicalism.
Physicalism is the view that objects of cognition are only the
result of underlying material activities so that your joys and
your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of
personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the the
behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated
molecules. Hayek subscribes to this physicalist view. He argues
that the mind is simply the by-product of the interaction of
brain material.
The mind,
he argues,
"operates on the
physiological events and arranges them into a structure or order
that becomes the basis for their mental significance." Or, more
explicitly, the mind's networking process is governed by
"connections created in the nervous system by past linkages" and
the ordering process is "determined by the system of connections
by which impulses can be transmitted from neuron to neuron."
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C.

UNPREDICTABILITY

Given the presence of iteration and sensitivity to initial
conditions in the "sensory order" the question that inevitably
arises

for

predicted.

Hayek

is

whether

one's

The position he arrives

"sensory
at

is that

order"
the

can

be

number

of

"Mind," in short says Hayek "is the order prevailing in a
particular part of the physical universe—that part of it which we
call ourselves."
This view is not entirely inconsistent with Nietzsche's
philosophy. According to Leslie Paul Thiele, Nietzsche "reduced
mental and spiritual activity to the status of physiological
events." Indeed Nietzsche argued that moral and aesthetic
judgments are merely the "'subtlest nuances' of the physis" and
"My objections to the music of Wagner are physiological
objections: why should I trouble to dress them up in aesthetic
formulas? After all aesthetics is nothing but a kind of applied
physiology." More importantly, however, Nietzsche is with Hayek
in remaining skeptical as to the possibility of determining the
origins of our physiological states. According to Nietzsche all
conscious activity is suspected to have a specific physiological
basis, but we may never know precisely "how deep and high the
physis reaches."
Indeed, Hayek's physicalism, leads him to a conclusion that
is the opposite of the one that normally follows from it; namely
unpredictability. Hayek subscribes to what is called a token
identity theory of the mind. The token identity theory holds that
each psychological state corresponds to a physical state. While
preserving a commitment to physicalism the token identity theory,
however, does not insist that the same mental state in two
separate individuals has the same physical identity— only that
each mental state corresponds to a physical state. Hayek makes
this qualification because he recognizes that which is remarkable
about the human brain is not its universally present material,
but the unique connections that emerge within this material. To
put this notion another way consider what is called the idea of
"grandma neurons." Suppose everybody's idea of "grandma" was
universally determined by the same physical collection of neurons
in everyone's brain. If those "grandma neurons" died in one
person's brain not only could they not say "grandma," they could
not think of her even if she were standing in front of them.
Although neurons die and malfunction with regularity, nothing
like this has ever been observed. The implication of this matter
is that humans do not universally share the same physical state
when they share the same mental state; i.e. there are not neurons
in each person's head that correspond to the idea of "grandma."
Instead, similar mental states have a different sort of physical
manifestation; they arise from the historical connections that
are woven into our individual brain material. The token identity
theory of the mind thus allows Hayek to at once claim that the
mind is a physical phenomenon, and yet not concede any sort of
uniformity or predictability from mind to mind.
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variables— past, present and future— that would have to be taken
into account are too numerous and detailed. It is impossible, he
says, to accumulate and compute all the facts which contribute to
the exact behavior of the "sensory order." Although we may know
general knowledge of how a "sensory order" functions through the
process of "linking," Hayek nevertheless asserts that we
will rarely if ever enable us to predict the precise
result of any situation. While we can explain the
principle on which certain phenomena are produced and
can from this knowledge exclude the possibility of
certain results, for example, of certain events
occurring together, our knowledge will in a sense
only be negative; that is, it will merely enable us
to preclude certain results but not enable us to
narrow the range of possibilities sufficiently so
that only one remains.109
With this assertion Hayek distinguishes between "explanations in
principle" and "explanations in detail." The former are designed
to explain kinds of events or processes, the latter explain particular
events or processes.110 Indeed, "explanations in detail" refer to
the logical structure of the unique manifestation of an event or
process. Unlike an "explanation in principle," an "explanation in
detail"

accounts for the properties of sensitivity to initial

conditions and iteration in a phenomena. Hayek argues, however,
that

since

we

cannot

account

for

these

properties

and

are

accordingly inhibited from giving an "explanation in detail" of
our own mind's working. "If it should turn out," he says, "that
it is basically impossible to state or communicate all the rules
109 Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies in
the Abuse of Reason, 74.
110 Hayek, Studies in Philosophy. Politics and Economics.
6-7 .

which

govern

our

actions...this

would

limitation of our possible knowledge

and,

imply

an

inherent

in particular,

the

impossibility of ever fully explaining a mind of the complexity
of our own.”111 Given the presence of iteration and sensitivity
to initial conditions, Hayek argues that the number and detail of
possible link patterns that would have to be taken into account
to predict the cognitive activity of our own "sensory order" is
greater

than

that

which

can

manipulated by our own mind.

be

ascertained

and

effectively

In other words, Hayek argues that

there are far too many potential patterns of "links" or what he
calls cognitive "constellations" to be effectively computed by
one's own mind.
Hayek uses a calculator to elucidate this point that the
number

of

"constellations"

the

"sensory

order"

can

possibly

become through additions and reorganizations is of a far greater
magnitude than that same "sensory order" can compute: Suppose the
highest value a calculator can display is 999,999,999. There are
500,000,000 sums of two positive numbers which equal 999,999,999.
Furthermore, there are 499,999,000 combinations of two positive
numbers that equal 999,999,998; etc., etc. As a result, the total
number of summation the calculator can perform is greater than
the largest number it can display. To this number would have to
be added all the combinations of three numbers,
etc.

four numbers,

Ultimately the total number of distinct combinations the

111 Hayek; quoted in Gray, Hayek on Liberty, 2d ed.,

22.
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calculator

can

perform

far

exceed

the

calculator's

display

capacity.112
Applying

this

same

principle

to

the

human mind,

Hayek

concludes that although "linking" or connecting sensory events
provides an explanation of the general principle on which our
"sensory order" operates,

we shall never, by means of the same

brain be able to arrive at a detailed explanation of its working
in particular

circumstances,

or be

able to predict

what the

results of an operation will be. To achieve this would require a
higher order of complexity because,

in addition to showing how

any one sensory experience will behave in a particular situation,
we would also have to be capable of showing how any one of these
sensory events would behave in any one of a large number of other
situations. Prediction, in othe words, is based on the impossible
capacity to self-consciously know the behavior,

over time,

of

each sensory event under varying future conditions. Like Hayek's
calculator, the sheer number of possible future scenarios exceeds
our conscious computational capacity. Although the principle upon
which the function and pattern of growth of our complex "sensory
order" may be appreciated,
facts

which

predictions

contribute
in

the impossibility of knowing all the
to

particular

its

specific

cases.

features

Consequently,

precludes
we

cannot

introspectively access our own mind's operation. The properties
of Hayek's connectionist theory of mind thus leads him to the
conclusion that there

is no overseeing or Cartesian self who

H 2 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 246-247.
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directs our cognitive activity in a conscious manner.
there is a terra incognita^ an unknown territory of the

Instead,

self.

This

conclusion however, is not without profound implications for both
political

and

economic

theory,

implications

which

Hayek

explicitly recognizes.
III. HOW H A Y E K ’S IMPROVEMENT INFORMS
BOTH HIS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THEORIES
As we have seen,

Hayek improves on the Nietzschean theory

of mind and demonstrates that the unified subject, far from being
a

self-certain

foundation,

is

a

fiction,

a

historically

contingent construct beneath whose apparent unity teams a welter
of non-conscious cognitive activity.
says Hayek,
They

that all societies and economies arise and change.

result

motivations
orders."

It is out of this material,

from

the

complex

as they manifest

Societies

and

interaction
in millions

economies,

in

of
of

preferences
seething

other

and

"sensory

words,

are

the

composites of supporting and counteracting actions and reactions
of individual "sensory orders," amalgams of multiple relations in
motion.

Accordingly,

all sociological

economies

to

interplay

of motivations

laws,

international

culture,

civilization;
individuals'

etc.
they

are

emerge
with

a

part

of

directly
each

The views people

things

the

Consequently,

forms

basis

the
from

other,

emergence of society.
thus

the

from

by-products

of individual human beings.

are

dealings

wars,

phenomena,

of

natural
the

they

local
of

the

Customs,

history

of

composite

of

with

the

form of each other

and

the

coeval

social

structure.

when we speak of a particular society or economy,
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we are not talking about a unitary thing. Instead, says Hayek, it
is

just

a

collection

short-hand
of people's

way

of

referring

motivations,

to

an

opinions,

interactive

preferences

and

ideas, and to speak of it as if it were a unitary whole obscures
all these complex relationships which contribute to the overall
pattern of activity that results in a society or economy.
A.

IMPLICATIONS

Hayek's

view

FOR

that

H A Y E K 1S

the

POLITICAL

evaluations

THEORY

and

opinions

of

individuals trigger the social sphere contrasts sharply with the
view that

societies

are the products

of human

reason.

Indeed,

Hayek claims that the orderly structures we find in society "are
the product of the actions of many men, but are not the result of
human

d e s i g n ."113 Order,

he

explains,

arises

"spontaneously"

through the complex interplay of millions of "sensory orders." It
is an order which evolves in a gradual and decentralized process,
which

constitutes

an unintended effect

of the motivations

and

actions of many interacting individuals and not human design.
Hayek
descriptive

claims
and

that

value

his

notion

free.

The

of

"spontaneous

notion

of

the

order"

is

"spontaneous

order," he says, simply functions as an explanatory framework for
the complex phenomena we call society;

it describes the evolution

of societies without teleological or purposive pretensions. Hayek
does

recognize that the original meaning of the term evolution

refers to a manifestation of potentialities already contained in
the germ. His theory of social evolution, however, does not imply

113 Hayek,

Law. Legislation and Liberty, 36-37.
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such a succession of specific steps. Hayek disagrees with those like
Karl Marx and August Comte, who assert that "evolution implies a
necessary
which

sequence

the

p a s s ."114

of predetermined

development
Instead,

of

an

stages

organism

or

or

through

institution

Hayek's notion of society

change is not teleological,

phases

is

must

'blind,'

i.e.

societies simply fulfil and consume

themselves in a discursive fashion.
Since his theory of "spontaneous order" has no normative
content Hayek's concept of the "sensory order" does not lead, at
a foundational level, to any commitment to inviolable individual
rights.

Instead,

Hayek claims that all values and

'rights'

are

the products of and not antecedent to the "spontaneous order."
These

"particular

critically

aspects

examined

of

only

culture,"
within

he

the

explains,
context

"can
of

be

that

culture... [and] we must stop with our criticism of something that
has no better grounds for existence than that it is the accepted
basis

of

the

particular

tradition”115

Furthermore,

spontaneously created values are not static:
It is a fact which we must recognize that even what
we regard as good or beautiful is changeable— if not
in any recognizable manner that would entitle us to
take a relativistic position, then in a sense that in
many respects we do not know what will appear as the
good or beautiful to another generation... It is not
only his knowledge, but also his aims and values that
man is a creature of his civilization; in the last
resort, it is the relevance of these individual
wishes to the perpetuation of the group or the
species that will determine whether they persist or
change.
It is, of course, a mistake to believe that

114 Ibid., 24.
115 Ibid., 25.
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we can draw conclusions about what our values ought
to be simply because we realize that they are the
product of evolutions.116
Hayek seems here to make a Weberian point. Like Max Weber, Hayek
asserts that our values, "even our highest, our ultimate” values
are historically "mutable and transitory."117 Indeed, like Weber,
Hayek

claims

that

a ... spontaneous
discursive
"mass

"value-judgements

manner"— they

are

are
the

made

everywhere

by-product

of

in
the

interplay of historical forces118— and the Weberian

psychological

character"119

that

emerges

from

this

interplay is what Hayek calls society.
Inasmuch as nothing in the detailed content of our moral
conventions

is

unchanging

or

unalterable,

Hayek

goes

on

to

contend that we are compelled to abandon the whole notion that
values have a character or universality or fixity.
thus," remarks

Hayek,

"one

possible

sense

in

"There is

which

we

may

legitimately regard human values as relative and speak of the
probability of their further evolution."120 It furthermore raises
serious questions about the status of an innate "human nature."
Indeed, Hayek claims that:
The important point is that every man growing up in a
given culture will find in himself rules, or he may
116 Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1960), 35-36.
117 Wilhelm Hennis, Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 146-162.
118 Ibid.
it>id.
120 Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics.
28.
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discover that he acts in accordance with rules— and
will similarly recognize the actions of others as
conforming or not conforming to various rules. This
is, of course, not proof that they are a permanent or
unalterable part of 'human nature,' or that they are
innate, but proof only that they are part of a
cultural heritage...121
With this assertion Hayek

joins Nietzsche in his voyage

beyond good and evil. Indeed, like Nietzsche, Hayek contends that
morality is a social creation which has no static or objective
basis.

The

implicit

overestimated.

"realism"

of

ordinary moral

language

is

The fact that a particular norm has evolved does

not guarantee that it is optimal, nor that it will continue to
function in the future. "Our present values," explains Hayek,
exist only as elements of a particular cultural
[historical] tradition and are significant only for
some more or less long phase of evolution— whether
this phase includes some of our pre-human ancestors
or
is
confined to certain periods
of human
civilization.
We have no more grounds to ascribe to
them eternal existence than the human race.122
Similarly, Nietzsche claims that our values are not true all the
way through; they are not transhistorical or timeless realities.
Nietzsche explains:
In some remote corner of the universe, poured out and
glittering in the innumerable solar systems, there
was once a star on which clever animals invented
ethics. That was the haughtiest and most mendacious
minute of world history— yet only one minute. After
nature had drawn a few breaths the star grew cold and
the clever animals had to die.123
In this sense,

when someone claims that a social structure is

"socially unjust," the universe yawns and takes another breath.
121 Hayek, Law Legislation and Liberty. 19.
122 Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics,
38.
123 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, 42.
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It is therefore Hayek's opinion that it is fraudulent to use the
words "social injustice" when what one is really talking about is
preferences, i.e. what social arrangement one endorses. For this
reason "social injustice" has no meaning for Hayek and he reports
that "to discover the meaning of what is called 'social justice'
has been one of my chief preoccupations for more than ten years.
I have

failed

in this

endeavor

or

rather,

have

reached the

conclusion that...the phrase has no meaning whatever."124
Despite his emphasis on the individual, Hayek acknowledges
the feedback relationship between society and the self.

Indeed,

he believes that any political theory must not only take into
account

the

individual,

but

an individuals'

interaction with

their environment including the community of people around them.
Any description of the individual must therefore be supplemented
by a social theory.
Regarding social theory, Hayek contends that social objects
emerge when a multitude of individuals converge upon a single
system of rules to create social objects such as language,
and markets. This convergence,

furthermore,

law,

is essential to the

formation of such social objects. For example, no single person
can

create

shared.

new

To make

words
sense,

and meanings:

language

must

always

be

individual words must belong to a pre

existing common storehouse of language. As a means of elucidating
this account of public meaning Neville Wakefield's chess analogy is
illuminating: From the point of view of someone new to chess it

124 Hayek, New_Studies in Philosophy. Politics. Economics
and the History of Ideas. 57.
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might

seem logical that one should study chess

in terms of all

the moves in all the games that have ever been played.

But this

approach would fail to account for the fact that each individual
move

is

selected

as

an

option

from

a

much

larger

range

of

possible moves, and that no single move is significant, except in
relation

to

what

preceded

it

strategy of one's opponent.
one

must

look

to

a

and

of

course

to

To study chess properly,

system

of

principles

for

anticipating the moves— a system which underlies
every point

in the game.

the

projected
therefore,

making

every move

and
at

Only when a player converges onto his

opponents structure and internalizes it in terms of its overall
coherence rather than its individual parts does the game become
meaningful.125
According

to

Hayek,

"internalized structure"
objects

such

"internalized

as

a

similar

convergence

upon

an

is necessary in the creation of social

language,

structures"

morals,

"social

etc.

Hayek

rules;"

rules

calls
which

these
govern

shared meanings and social practices. Hayek explains:
We are able to understand one another and get along
with one another, are able to act successfully on
plans because most of the time members of our
civilization conform to unconscious patterns of
conduct, show regularity in their action that is not
the result...of any conscious adherence to known
rules,
but
of
firmly
established
habits
and
traditions.
The
general
o b s e rvance
of
these
conventions
is
a necessary
condition
of
the
orderliness of the world in which we live, of our
being able to find our way through it though we do

125 Neville Wakefield, Postmodernism: Twilight of the Real
(London: Pluto Press, 1990), 73.
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not know their significance and may
consciously aware of their existence.126
And

not

even

be

even more explicitly: "We have seen that our capacity

recognize actions as following rules and having meaning

to

rests on

ourselves being already equipped with these rules. This knowledge
by acquaintance presupposes therefore that some of the rules in
terms of which we perceive and act are the same as those by which
the conduct of those actions we interpret is guided."127 This is
definitively a Burkean point. Indeed, according to Edmund Burke
we are subject to "prejudices" or "habits" that condition our
behavior. As Burke writes,
I am bold enough to confess that we are men of
untaught feelings, that instead of casting them away
all our old prejudices, we cherish them...Prejudice
is ready application in the emergency; it previously
engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and
virtue and does not leave the man hesitating in the
moment
of
decision skeptical,
puzzled,
and
unresolved.
Prejudice renders man's virtue his
habit, and not a series of unconnected acts.128
Hayek does

appreciatethe

play in a society. According to

important

role

his writings,

"social

rules"

the efficacious

operation of a society depends for its existence on a cultural
matrix of historical practices which shape and permeate the moral
and

intellectual

Hayek,

capacities of

the

individual.

Society,

for

hinges upon individuals who are not natural datum but

rather historical achievements. "The rules we are discussing," he
writes, "are those that are not so much useful to the individuals
126 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 66.
127 Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics,
59.
128 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France.
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company), 76-77.
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who observe them,

as those that

(if they are generally observed)

make all the members of the group more effective,

because they

give opportunities to act within a social order,"129 As an example
of what Hayek means by ’’opportunities,"
example:

Suppose

that

consider the

following

long ago any human encountering

another

would either try to kill him or run away. This sort of behavior
would certainly not have led to the formation of ordered groups.
When,

however,

some humans somewhere chose to cease fighting or

fleeing they were

’liberated,' they found that they were better

able to pursue other e n d s .130 Through this historical experience
they gained wisdom.

They learned that not

made for a different social opportunities.

fighting or fleeing
Hayek's insight here

is that "social rules" may thus be profitably viewed as vehicles
of information; they contain the accumulated experiences of many

129 Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy. Politics, Economics
and the History of Ideas, 7. Emphasis in Original.
130 This view stands in sharp contrast to Nietzsche's.
Nietzsche does not find the cultural matrix of historical
practices or "social rules" to have any 'liberating' content. He
instead finds them oppressive.
He contends that social
conventions are not self-evident truths, but products of
inheritance, things that are historically beaten into people. All
social conventions are the result of this process which
culminates in the colonization of people'sscope of view and the
internalization of conformity. A convention, therefore, is simply
the product of historical conquest, the product of "fossilized
violence." Moreover, Nietzsche maintains that humans are born
into these already constructed matrices of social conventions or
"strait-jackets" of "custom" that are historically embedded in
our understanding. As a result, how we behave is determined by a
historical
"archive"
of
understanding.
Our
behavior,
consequently, is not the product of free thought, but confined by
the parameters of an historical inventory. Accordingly, Nietzsche
criticizes "social rules" as disciplinary devices. Indeed, he
claims that social behavior derived from a "social rule" is not
neutral, it is but an inculcated expression of an historical
force.
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generations

and provide

us with

the

ability

to

see

through

different social opportunities.
Despite
possible

the

to

gain

fact

that

societal

Hayek

has

opportunities

no

doubt

through

that
the

it

is

use

of

"social rules," he is emphatic in his belief that arresting these
rules is dangerous. By ossifying our "social rules" we ignore the
fact that

society is spontaneously emerging.

this movement

To not recognize

and force "social rules" prostrate on a society

like a rigid and inflexible grid only invites disaster. Indeed,
when we impose a preconceived pattern on society we inhibit our
ability to adapt to the necessities of future circumstances and
says Hayek,

"we should not be surprised if society,

as such,

ceases to function as a creative force."131 Such a concern for
adaptability,

furthermore,

is implicit in Hayek's critique of

democratic statesmen. According to Hayek:
The successful politician owes his power to the fact
that he moves within the accepted framework of
thought, that he thinks and talks conventionally. It
would be almost a contradiction in terms for a
politician to be a leader in the field of ideas. His
task in a democracy is to find out what the opinions
held by the largest number are, not to give currency
to new opinions which may become the majority view in
some distant future.132
Hayek's recognition of the socializing effect of society on
the self,
rules"

however,

that

individuals

is qualified.

contribute
are not

to

the

immutable.

He contends that the "social
shaping

of

As a result,

the

behavior

of

social change is

131 Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics
and the History of Ideas, 20.
132 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 112.
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implicit in Hayek*s philosophy.
conservatives among you,

Indeed,

he announces that

"the

who up to this point may be rejoicing,

will now probably be disappointed. The proper conclusion from the
considerations

I

have

advanced

is

by

no

confidently accept all the old traditional
r u l e s ."133 Nor,

claims Hayek,

means

that

that

contained

within

even that there

a

society

may

'values'" or "social
are

any

rules" or moral principles that are beyond question.
argues

we

is

the

"social

Instead, he
proformative

capacity to initiate change, to innovate— but not because people
are outside their cultural context, but because their actions are
uncferdetermined by that context;
passive

robots

society,

programmed to follow the conventions

instead

they

are

context of that society.
order,” he explains,
uniqueness

individual human beings are not

arises

determined by the

capable

of

resistance

Each connectionist mind,

of larger
within

the

each "sensory

comprises a unique pattern and out of this
a

natural

social

reject Marxian claim that

diversity

structure.

which

is

Consequently,

not

wholly

Hayek would

it is exclusively a person's

"social

existence that determines his consciousness."134

more

As a result of this natural diversity,

societies are far

ill-behaved and elusive than political

theorist

imagined.

formerly

Hayek contends that society is not rendered from the

133 Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics
and the History of Ideas, 19.

134 Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy; quoted in Karl Popper, "The Autonomy of
Sociology," Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays ed. J.B.
Schneewind (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1968), 426.
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sort of distinct causes and effects that might be written in
Newton's own handwriting.
centerless

phenomenon

Instead,

with

he claims that society is a

constantly

shifting

borders.

He

maintains that a society has no essence, no inherent character,
no

teloSf

it is simply the given or "spontaneous" configuration of

historical forces at a given moment in elapsing time. Society is,
as Foucault puts it, "nothing other than the instant photograph
of multiple struggles continuously in transformation."135
In this sense Hayek concludes that no society is perm anent.
single

historical

episode,

no

single

historical

network

No
of

arrangements is inherently static; in all historical episodes and
arrangements there is always tension and struggle,

both actual

and potential, movement is going on at all times in everything—
customs,

laws,

languages, morals,

arts, etc. As he points out,

prevailing moral systems "do not always give unambiguous answers
to

the

questions

which

arise,

contradictory."136 As a result,

but

often

prove

internally

"we are forced to develop and

refine our moral systems continuously .”137 Ultimately, the conclusion
that flows from Hayek's theory of mind is not that society is a
rigid form, but that it is a shifting and unsteady mass comprised

1.35 Michel Foucault, Foucault Live ed. Sylb6re Lot ringer
(New York: Semiotext, 1989), 183; quoted in Leslie Paul Thiele,
"The Agony of Politics: The Nietzschean Roots of Foucault's
Thought," American Political Science Review (September 19 90),
921.
136 Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy. Politics. Economics
and the History of Ideas, 20.
I 37 Ibid. Emphasis added.

62

of a multitude of decentralized interactions among many emerging
"sensory orders."
B.

IMPLICATIONS

FOR

HAYEK'S

ECONOMIC

THEORY

In order to understand how Hayek's improved theory of mind
informs his economic theory we must understand what he calls the
"knowledge problem.”138 The "knowledge problem" arises because
social behavior is not based on 'objective' decisions,

but upon

the subjective motions of individual's "sensory orders," where
the key variables

are their manifestations

in the particular

motivations of individuals. Because human action does not exist
separate from the emerging cognitive template or "sensory order"
of each individual a scientific examination of human action will
fail. Human action,

in other words, does not have an objective

ontological status; there is no Archimedean point from which to
describe it. It is contingent rather upon what we 'think' about
other people and things.
To make the point clearer that the state of mind of the
individuals is what is important to human behavior, consider an
example put forth by Joel Schwartz: "When I roast a leg of a lamb
over

a fire until

it

is

a charred pile

of ashes,

I may be

conducting a unsuccessful barbecue, but when Odysseus does the
same thing he may be conducting a successful sacrifice.
Odysseus

is not

'roasting'

at all

since

'roasting'

Indeed

only has

meaning internal to the activity of food preparation. Nor are we
in fact 'doing the same thing,' although behavioral descriptions

138 Friedrich Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," The
American Economic Review (September 1945), passim.
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or pictures of the movements of our bodies may be identical."139
An illustration is taken from Hayek to demonstrate

this

point that the subjective motivations of individuals,

same

and not

’objective facts,' are what is relevant to social behavior: Our
belief that a magic charm does not work is irrelevant to the
social

significance

of

the

charm.

It

is

irrelevant

to

our

comprehension of the actions of the individuals who believe in
the charm.140 In his book on Hayek G. R. Steele puts this point
more directly:
Human action is never centered upon objective facts.
For
example,
a
b a r o meter
is
capable
of
giving...information about the physical world; but a
barometer becomes changed as a fact once the purpose
for which it can be used is known; and this
information is an abstraction from the physical
attributes of the barometer, which might serve as a
paddle, a weapon, or as an instrument to gage airpressure. In other words, the facts of the social
sciences are the opinions held by the people whose
actions are studied.141
As

a

result

of

this

subjectivity,

says

Hayek,

it

is

impossible to accurately plan an economy without accounting for
peoples'

emerging "sensory orders."

perceptions,

judgments

and attitudes

Indeed,

because all their

arise

from a subjective

cognitive

framework,

people may react to the

different

ways,

to

and

different

stimuli

in

same stimuli
the

same

in

way.

Accordingly, to accurately plan an economy the planner would have

^-39 Joel D. Schwartz, "Participation and Multisubjective
Understanding: An Interpretivist Approach to the Study of
Political Participation," Journal of Politics (Vol. 46, 1984),
1119.
140 G.R. Steele, The Economics of Friedrich Hayek (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 79.
141 Ibid.

80.
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to acquire all of the "knowledge" of how these "sensory orders"
operate

and why

human beings

act

a certain

way under certain

circumstances. An accurate explanation of any social phenomena
must therefore take into the mind-sets of the people who comprise
a society.

It must take into account how we acquire knowledge to

solve our encountered problems.

Hence,

a theory of human action

can succeed only if it accounts for the cognitive operations of
human

beings

and provides

an explanation

of how

knowledge

is

acquired to solve problems.
As was discussed earlier, however, Hayek demonstrates that
"we

are

unknown

cognitive

to

workings.

ourselves, " that
If

his

we

cannot

demonstration

is

know

valid,

our

own

then

the

economic planner faces a fundamental obstacle in the positivist
study of human affairs.

Put more precisely,

without the direct

apprehension of people's cognitive operations, economic planners
are

effectively

denied

the

access

to

quantifiable

causal

imputations of each "sensory order" and hence economic phenomena.
Indeed,

the economic planner can never decipher or distangle the

connective process of their human subject matter and discover the
'causes'

of an

economy.

As David Hubei puts it,

input: Man's only way of knowing the outside world.

"there is an
There is an

output: man's only way of responding to the outside world...[a]nd
between

input

thought,

and

Hayek,

this

and

output

whatever

there

else makes

"everything else"

is

everything e ls e . . .memories,

man

h u man ."142 According

to

is not knowable. The patterns of

142 David Hubei, "The Brain," Scientific American
(September 1979), 32. Emphasis added.
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the

"sensory order," he

says,

comprise

an intricate

tensional

network of cross-points and junctions that support and counteract
each

other.

emergent

Where

these

cognitive

crosscurrents

landscape

are

interwoven,

terra incognita

is

the

to even the most

inquisitive economic planner.
The broad implication of this view is that economies cannot
be centrally planned.

Since the basic source of human behavior—

the human mind— eludes thorough introspection,

economic planning

based on social scientific explanations are doomed to err.
a

fatal

conceit,

knowledge

he

necessary

contends,
to

plan

central planner. At best,

to

an

believe

economy

is

time

it

is

contemporaneous.

the

technical

accessible

to

the

a central planner can acquire limited

knowledge about their human subject matter,
the

that

It is

compiled

Moreover,

and

knowledge that,

analyzed,

a planner

cannot

is

by

no

longer

possibly

collect

thorough data or "knowledge" on each of the millions of "sensory
orders" that are underlay an economy.
known

only

to

themselves

and not

People's motives are only

understood properly

even by

them. The idea that the relevant information to efficiently plan
an economy can be concentrated in the calculations of a central
planning board is thus absurd.
The
supplies

central

planner

and demands

that

interaction

of millions

result,

p l a nned

a

of

cannot

possibly

will manifest
subjective

economy

has

no

calculate

via the
"sensory
means

all

the

comprehensive
orders."

of

As

a

accurately

communicating to consumers and producers the actual supplies and
demands that will emerge at a given point in time. The only way

to consistently and accurately determine this,

and make full use

of all the decentralized information contained in our "sensory
orders,” is through

the

forum of

the market.

Only out

of the

interaction of all the "sensory orders” in a market can "prices"
spontaneously arise to communicate to consumers and producers the
supplies and demands of goods at a given point in time. Moreover,
as supplies

and demands change this information can be fluidly

communicated through price changes.

In the end, central planners

do not have a means like the spontaneous "price" to reflect right
quickly the actual supplies and demands in an economy.
Ultimately,

says Hayek, unlike the market, central planners

do not utilize all of the dispersed "knowledge" or information
embodied

in

our

"sensory

orders."

compress individuals into formulae.
information
economy;

than

they

concretely

assume

the

Central

planners

Consequently,

contributes

"knowledge

to

the

problem"

instead

they use less
motion

away

of

and,

an

says

Hayek, "disregard everything that is important and significant in
the real w o rld ."143 They remove the economic world from its given
imperfection and unconformability and impose imaginary boundaries
on the fluid media of individuals that is the economy.
planners

thus

do

not

deal

with

reality.

They

move

Central
from

any

imaginable economic world to an abstract fantasy in which humans
are

abolished

ahistorical

and

monads.

all

that

Indeed,

to

remains

are

paraphrase

featureless

Roland

Barthes,

Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," 530.
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attempting to capture economic life the planner actually sees
dead.144
CONCLUSION

To recap,

we have seen that Hayek maintains Nietzsche's

claim that "we are unknown to ourselves," and that he does so by
improving on Nietzsche's connectionist theory of mind. We have
seen

also

that

Hayek demonstrates

that

subject to the properties of iteration,
conditions and unpredictability,
knowledge

of the cognitive

conscious

mind.

rejects

analyses

Based
of

societies

is

sensitivity to initial

properties which forbid self-

processes

on this

our emergent mind

which

terra incognita

culminate
of the

and economies

which

in our

self Hayek
force

the

unique and complex entities that are humans beings into unbending
and inactual explanatory grids.

Instead,

Hayek's theory of the

"sensory order" forces him to confront life as it is given;
restores

it

life to its original difficulty by affirming its motion

and intricacy.Q

144 Wakefield, Postmodernism: The Twilight of the Real, 3.
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